

# A-level HISTORY 7042/2R

Component 2R The Cold War, c1945-1991

Mark scheme

June 2024

Version: 1.0 Final



Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

No student should be disadvantaged on the basis of their gender identity and/or how they refer to the gender identity of others in their exam responses.

A consistent use of 'they/them' as a singular and pronouns beyond 'she/her' or 'he/him' will be credited in exam responses in line with existing mark scheme criteria.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aga.org.uk

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# Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

# Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity, you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level, you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly Level 3 with a small amount of Level 4 material it would be placed in Level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the Level 4 content.

# Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

#### **Section A**

0 1 With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying relations between the USA and USSR in the years 1972 to 1979.

[30 marks]

Target: AO2

Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within the historical context.

#### **Generic Mark Scheme**

L5: Shows a very good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with a strong awareness of the historical context to present a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. The answer will convey a substantiated judgement. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context.

25-30

- L4: Shows a good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with an awareness of the historical context to provide a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. Judgements may, however, be partial or limited in substantiation. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context. 19–24
- L3: Shows some understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance together with some awareness of the historical context. There may, however, be some imbalance in the degree of breadth and depth of comment offered on all three sources and the analysis may not be fully convincing. The answer will make some attempt to consider the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates an understanding of context.

  13–18
- L2: The answer will be partial. It may, for example, provide some comment on the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question but only address one or two of the sources, or focus exclusively on content (or provenance), or it may consider all three sources but fail to address the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context.

  7–12
- L1: The answer will offer some comment on the value of at least one source in relation to the purpose given in the question but the response will be limited and may be partially inaccurate. Comments are likely to be unsupported, vague or generalist. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context.

Nothing worthy of credit.

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Students must deploy knowledge of the historical context to show an understanding of the relationship between the sources and the issues raised in the question, when assessing the significance of provenance, the arguments deployed in the sources and the tone and emphasis of the sources. Descriptive answers which fail to do this should be awarded no more than Level 2 at best. Answers should address both the value and the limitations of the sources for the particular question and purpose given.

Source A: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

#### Provenance, tone and emphasis

- this is a public address by Brezhnev and is valuable to understand the relationship between the two nations. It not only reflects the Soviet leader's personal opinion but the Soviet Union's attitude towards the USA at this time
- as Brezhnev is Soviet leader at this time, this speech reflects official Soviet attitudes and therefore is
  more valuable, however, value could be lessened due to the fact that this is a public address and
  therefore will not focus on any negative developments and stumbling blocks in the process
- as this address was given in 1973, this is at the beginning of the process of détente and just after the first SALT agreement was signed in 1972 therefore may be less valuable as it is overly optimistic for such an early stage in the process
- Brezhnev's tone appears to be extremely optimistic for the future and is attempting to present a
  positive view of the policy of détente to reassure the American public. However, this could be less
  valuable as it could be an attempt at Soviet propaganda trying to influence the public into believing all
  credit for détente goes to the USSR.

# **Content and argument**

- Brezhnev argues that negotiations and talks between himself and Nixon have been extremely positive
  and productive. This is valuable because summit diplomacy had already begun, beginning with the
  Moscow Summit in 1972 where the two leaders discussed strategic limitation of weapons
- Brezhnev also suggests that significant questions have been answered at these negotiations which is very valuable, as SALT I was signed in 1972, agreeing limits on strategic weapons such as ICBMs and SLBMs. The agreement was to last for 5 years and opened the path for negotiation
- Brezhnev comments on the need to continue these negotiations and nurture the relationship between
  the two countries, which is very valuable because not all issues were finalised at the SALT
  negotiations as it was simply an interim agreement. Both the USSR and USA wanted a longer-lasting
  agreement which would be created in future discussions over SALT II
- finally, Brezhnev suggests that the Cold War environment is over and mankind wants to breathe freely. This is less valuable as policies towards Eastern Europe had been defensive and aggressive to ensure their loyalty to the USSR.

## Source B: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

## Provenance, tone and emphasis

- this is a diplomatic report written by Dobrynin to another diplomat therefore is quite likely to be relatively frank and open in his opinion on US-Soviet relations. This is valuable to understand the relationship between the USA and USSR because it is a reflection of official Soviet attitudes
- as Dobrynin is the Soviet Ambassador, he would have been a crucial communicator of the policy of détente and would have attended various meetings, summits and negotiations, therefore demonstrating the official Soviet attitude towards their relationship
- as this is written in mid-1978, it is in the midst of Jimmy Carter's new presidential term and summit
  diplomacy is coming to an end. This could be less valuable because Dobrynin may be influenced by
  the limited progress made with Carter's new tough attitude towards the USSR and their changing
  relationship
- Dobrynin's tone is very critical of Carter and suggests that he has dictated a new course of 'détente'
  which has damaged the relationship between the USSR and USA. This could be less valuable
  because he is clearly attempting to be highly critical of American policy in order to express the reality
  of their relationship at this time.

## **Content and argument**

- Dobrynin is arguing that the Carter administration has brought with it a new, unstable policy towards the USSR. This is valuable to understand their relationship because Carter had abandoned previous decisions made by Ford at the Vladivostok Summit and entered his presidency arguing for significantly limited arms in SALT II. This undermined the policy of détente and led the USSR to lose faith in the USA
- he is also arguing that the USA follows the policy of détente according to their own selfish interests.
   This could be less valuable because in fact, the USA had fully participated in summit diplomacy and had helped to reach the Helsinki Accords in 1975 and SALT I in 1972, meaning they were willing to co-operate with the USSR
- Dobrynin suggests that the USA applies a different concept of détente to the USSR regarding issues such as Africa and human rights. This is valuable because despite following the policy of détente, the USA had intervened in Angola in 1975 to prevent the USSR and Cuba from gaining influence there, undermining the concept of détente
- Dobrynin is arguing that the USA is only following détente to try to reap a second win at the next presidential election. However, this could be less valuable as it is clear the USSR itself was not trying to follow the policy of détente by refusing to stop deployment of SS-20 missiles, so Carter's response to this was justified.

# Source C: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

#### Provenance, tone and emphasis

- this is a letter written by President Carter to Brezhnev, in the wake of the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, and is therefore valuable to demonstrate the official US response to this use of military force, suggesting that their relationship was in serious danger by 1979
- as Carter is President of the USA, this reflects official US attitudes and therefore is valuable to
  understand the extent of détente between the two countries. However, the value could be less due to
  Carter clearly wanting to persuade Brezhnev to remove his forces from Afghanistan at the risk of
  undermining their relationship
- as this is written in late 1979, this is at the end of the period of détente and immediately after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, the source may be less valuable as it is an immediate response to a critical event that threatened détente

 Carter's tone is extremely serious and does not underestimate the impact this will have on Soviet-American relations. He repeatedly refers to the crucial developments made between the two countries during this period of détente and therefore is valuable to show Carter's attitude towards Soviet actions.

#### **Content and argument**

- Carter indicates that the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan is a complete violation of the Basic Principles which were agreed by Brezhnev in 1972, where he committed to making every effort to remove the threat of war and disarm his country. This is valuable to understand the relationship between the two nations because it is clear that Brezhnev undermined this agreement for the benefit of Soviet interests
- Carter also argues that this is the first time since 1968 that the Soviet Union have directly used
  aggression in another country. This is valuable because Brezhnev did initiate the Brezhnev Doctrine
  after invading Czechoslovakia in 1968, and since this has not intervened directly anywhere else.
  However, it could be less valuable because the USSR had started to engage in proxy wars in areas
  such as Angola in 1975
- Carter suggests that this action will completely undermine the process of détente and will permanently damage Soviet-American relations. It is true that Carter condemned the invasion immediately in his Carter Doctrine which imposed sanctions on the USSR. After this, Soviet-American relations worsened
- finally, Carter suggests that this invasion will damage Soviet-American relations after many years of reconciling. This is valuable because summit diplomacy had gone a long way to improving their relationship and had resulted in the creation of multiple agreements such as the Helsinki Accords and SALT I & II.

#### **Section B**

**0 2** 'American economic interests were the main reason for the creation of East and West Germany by 1949.'

Assess the validity of this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

#### **Generic Mark Scheme**

- L5: Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. 21–25
- L4: Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated.
  16–20
- L3: Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist.
- L2: The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist.

6-10

L1: The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment.

Nothing worthy of credit.

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that American economic interests were the main reason for the creation of East and West Germany by 1949 might include:

- the USA wanted to ensure that their zone of Germany developed a degree of independence and economic security from the USSR to safeguard against any potential communist threat. Therefore, they prevented any further reparations being paid to the USSR from Germany in 1946 and started to create an economy based on the capitalist system, beginning the process of division
- the USA also wanted to strengthen Germany's reliance on the capitalist system to give them economic influence in their own zones, therefore Bizonia was created in 1947 which moved Germany towards a more formal split from the USSR rather than the agreed zones
- the USA wanted to base Germany's economy on the capitalist system and demonstrate that they
  could compete with the East, and therefore introduced a new currency, the Deutschmark, to bring
  economic stability and further separate the West from the East
- by airlifting food and supplies into Western Berlin during the Berlin Airlift, the USA was able to make the zone further dependent on US resources and leave severe shortages in the USSR's zone. This again made Western Berlin a symbol of a capitalist economy and solidified its division from the East
- America ultimately saw Berlin and Germany as a whole as a market for American goods and therefore took any opportunity to make the country dependent on the capitalist system, including offering Marshall Aid with conditions; meaning the division of Germany from the communist East was likely.

Arguments challenging the view that American economic interests were the main reason for the creation of East and West Germany by 1949 might include:

- Stalin's vision of East Germany as a communist satellite state from the beginning ultimately led to the division of Germany by 1949; he intended from the start that the Communist Party would take power and introduced other policies such as land reform, compulsory Russian language tuition and nationalisation of production
- Stalin's own economic interests led to the division of Germany because they repeatedly removed industrial and other resources to promote their own industrial recovery, along with further reparations.
   This led to an official division as Stalin increasingly felt threatened by US economic interests in their zones
- disagreements over four-power control of Germany and the inability for the four powers to work together led to the creation of East and West in 1949 – both zones of Germany had drawn up their own constitutions by the middle of 1949 leading to its official division into two states
- Stalin's aggression during the Berlin Blockade ultimately led to the creation of East and West Germany by 1949 because it led to severe food shortages and a lower quality of life in the USSR zone, leading to many citizens fleeing for the Western zones in search of a better life
- the problems in Germany were a microcosm of the Cold War in general by 1949, relations between the USA and USSR had deteriorated due to the situation in Eastern Europe and their differing ideologies. Therefore, the creation of East and West Germany can be seen as symbolic of the Iron Curtain being in place.

Students may argue that the USA's economic interests were a key reason for the creation of East and West Germany by 1949 – the need to base Germany's economy on the Western capitalist system by introducing Bizonia and the Deutschmark and then offering Marshall Aid. This clearly indicated that the USA wanted to benefit from economic developments in the area. However, it could be argued that similarly Stalin had his own economic interests that underpinned his policies in the USSR zone of Germany, and used this to push for a divided Germany.

0 3 'The USA's policy of containment in Asia was a failure in the years 1949 to 1954.'

Assess the validity of this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

#### **Generic Mark Scheme**

- L5: Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. 21–25
- L4: Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated.

  16–20
- L3: Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist.
- L2: The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist.

  6–10
- L1: The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment.

Nothing worthy of credit.

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that the USA's policy of containment in Asia was a failure in the years 1949 to 1954 might include:

- the USA's attempt to contain Communism in China by providing economic and military support to Jiang Jieshi in the Chinese Civil War was a failure. China fell to Communism in 1949 and formed the Sino-Soviet alliance which would cause long-lasting tensions
- the omission of South Korea from the Defensive Perimeter Strategy in 1950 gave North Korea the green light to invade the South without fear of US involvement. This meant that the USA's strategy to contain Communism through the DPS was a failure
- despite Communism not spreading to South Korea in the aftermath of the Korean War, the fact that
  Communism remained in the North despite UN intervention meant that the potential threat to other
  countries in South East Asia was very real. The USA had always believed North Korea's intention was
  to spread Communism in Japan, South East Asia and the Philippines, therefore the containment policy
  had failed
- there was no long-term solution to the situation in Vietnam and the USA's refusal to sign the Geneva Agreement demanding 'free' elections dictated by the North meant that further problems were to develop in the area. The USA's policy of containment was short-sighted and the potential that the North were determined to spread Communism to the South was not foreseen.

Arguments challenging the view that the USA's policy of containment in Asia was a failure in the years 1949 to 1954 might include:

- the support from the USA for Jiang Jieshi's nationalist government in Taiwan and excluding China from the United Nations, could be viewed as a success for the policy of containment as Communism had not been allowed to spread to Taiwan
- the USA had led the transformation of Japan into a Capitalist 'model state' by restructuring the economic system and supervising Japanese rearmament. Along with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, which ensured sovereignty and guaranteeing the use of military force if necessary, policies in Japan demonstrated the success of the policy of containment
- Communism was contained to North Korea in the aftermath of the Korean War, despite heavy US involvement via the United Nations and eventually being forced to withdraw with no changes to the 38th Parallel; essentially the policy of containment had succeeded
- the USA provided support to President Diem in South Vietnam and committed their involvement to ensure protection against the communist North. Despite later involvement resulting in the spread of Communism in Vietnam, by 1954 the USA was confident in a pro-American non-communist government aiming to eliminate Communism
- the USA took further steps to ensure the containment of Communism, such as increasing military defence spending in NSC-68 and establishing SEATO in an attempt to prevent the spread of Communism in South East Asia. This demonstrates that despite the loss of China, the USA was still committed to containing Communism in other areas of South East Asia.

Students may argue that ultimately the USA's policy of containment in Asia had failed in the years 1949 to 1954. Despite some successes, China had been lost to Communism and strengthened their alliance with the USSR, there were no long-term solutions for issues in Vietnam and other attempts to bolster against the spread of Communism in the region, such as NSC-68 and SEATO, were ineffective in preventing future problems. However, some students may argue that the setting up of Japan as a model state was a success and containment was essentially achieved in Korea, therefore the USA's policies could be considered successful.

0 4 To what extent was the Soviet Union and its leadership of the Eastern bloc weakened by the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968?

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

#### **Generic Mark Scheme**

- L5: Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. 21–25
- L4: Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated.

  16–20
- L3: Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist.

  11–15
- L2: The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist.

6–10

L1: The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment.

Nothing worthy of credit.

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that the Soviet Union and its leadership of the Eastern bloc was weakened by the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968 might include:

- Dubcek's anti-socialist reforms were threatening to the Soviet system and therefore weakened it. The Soviet Union was worried that if the reforms in Czechoslovakia went too far, other satellite states in Eastern Europe or the Republics, such as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, might follow. This could lead to a widespread rebellion against the Soviet Union's leadership of the Eastern bloc
- a Soviet military presence had to remain in Czechoslovakia until 1990 due to continued Czech
  resistance whilst the Soviets struggled to install a stable government. This meant constant challenges
  to Soviet authority in the region, weakening their control over satellite states
- the Soviet Union's use of force in this crisis damaged its international standing and prestige, particularly in regards to the USA. The Soviet Union's actions in Czechoslovakia derailed progress towards détente and led President Johnson to cancel a planned summit meeting with Brezhnev. This would continue to be a sticking point in détente throughout the 1970s and weakened the Soviet Union's international position
- the introduction of the Brezhnev Doctrine helped to worsen the Sino-Soviet split, due to China believing that they would use the doctrine as a justification to invade or interfere with Chinese Communism. The relationship between China and the USSR after 1968 was extremely hostile, leading to Sino-American relations improving and therefore further weakening the Soviet Union's international standing.

Arguments challenging the view that the Soviet Union and its leadership of the Eastern bloc was weakened by the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968 might include:

- the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was swift and effective as troops were already in place on the border due to military manoeuvres. When the forces invaded, they quickly took control of Prague, other major cities and communication/transportation links with minimal resistance demonstrating the USSR's strength of leadership in the face of rebellion
- the Soviet Union did not face significant international opposition to their invasion. The USA was not in a position to intervene or criticise due to their own involvement in Vietnam; and therefore, any efforts to pass a resolution in the UN Security Council condemning the attacks were simply blocked. This meant the Soviet Union's international position was not fully weakened
- even the Warsaw Pact did not oppose or feel threatened by the invasion in fact, they had gathered
  in the initial stages of the crisis to encourage Dubcek not to follow through with the reforms, therefore
  demonstrating the Warsaw Pact's supportive view of the Soviet Union and their leadership
- Czechoslovakia was able to re-establish stable government under Gustav Husak, with government
  censorship and controls preventing freedom of movement and reform whilst also improving economic
  conditions, one of the initial reasons for the crisis. Czechoslovakia became a cooperative member of
  the Warsaw Pact again, demonstrating the Soviet Union's control of their satellite states
- the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia deterred reformists elsewhere in its satellite states and therefore delayed the splintering of Eastern European Communism. After the invasion the Brezhnev Doctrine was introduced, which stated that Moscow had the right to intervene in any country where a communist government had been threatened. This led to stability for the Soviet Union's leadership in coming years.

Students may come to the conclusion that the crisis in Czechoslovakia may have appeared to weaken the Soviet Union and its leadership in the short-term due to a less than favourable reaction from China and having to keep a military presence in Czechoslovakia until 1990. However, in the long-term the crisis

was beneficial for the Soviet Union; they were able to re-assert their dominance in the satellite and republic states, use the Brezhnev Doctrine as an impetus to invade if there were any anti-communist challenges and faced little international opposition.